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THE ITEM VETO IN STATE COURTS

Richard Briffault *
Contemporary debates about state constitutional law have concentrated on
the role of state constitutions in the protection of individual rights and have paid
less attention to the state constitutional law of government structure.' This is
ironic since the emergence of a state jurisprudence of individual rights has been
hampered by the similarity of the texts of the state and federal constitutional
provisions concerning individual rights, whereas many state constitutional provisions dealing with government structure have no federal analogues, and thus
state jurisprudence in this area is free to develop outside the dominating shadow
of the Federal Constitution and the federal courts. Moreover, as the "laboratories of democracy" metaphor suggests, the study of the structural features of
state constitutions can enable us to consider alternative means of organizing representative democratic governments, assess the efficacy of different mechanisms
for governing, and illuminate the implications and consequences of aspects of
the federal government's structure that we ordinarily take for granted.
One of the distinctive structural features of state governments is the item,
or partial, veto. Whereas under the Federal Constitution, the President must
accept or reject in toto a bill passed by Congress, most state constitutions enable
governors to veto items in appropriations bills while simultaneously approving
other parts of those bills. The state item veto provisions have had an impact on
federal constitutional debate. Citing the states' experience, Presidents Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton have all called for some form of presidential item veto of
congressional appropriations measures, and Congress and scholars have deliberated the wisdom of such a change. 2
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., Columbia; J.D., Harvard. Research for this article was supported by the Walter E. 'Meyer Research in Law and Social Problems
Fund.
1. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 816-22 (1992) (noting unique state constitutional provisions reflect citizens' character and
"fundamental values"); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1150-53 (1992) (discussing Justice Brennan's encouragement of state constitutional discourse as arena of "defending the individual against authority"). Much of the modem
revival of interest in state constitutions stems from Justice Brennan's call for the development of a
state constitutional jurisprudence that would offset the United States Supreme Court's perceived
narrowing of rights during the Burger and, subsequently, the Rehnquist years. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-502
(1977).
2. Proposals to create a federal item veto date back to the Grant Administration and were
debated during the 1930s. See Note, FederalLegislation: The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System, 25 GEo. L.J. 106 (1936). President Reagan repeatedly proposed that the federal constitution be amended to give the president an item veto. See generally Symposium on the Line-Item
Veto, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 157-283 (1985) (many articles note President
Reagan's attempts to gain item veto power). Citing the powers of state governors, President Bush
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Within the states, the item veto has been a fertile source of state constitutional litigation. By one count, there were approximately 120 state item veto
cases from the nineteenth century through 1984. 3 Moreover, the frequency of
item veto litigation appears to be increasing. From 1985 through 1992, there
were at least twenty-five state supreme court decisions construing the item veto
provisions of state constitutions, 4 with eleven decisions in the 1991-1992 biennium alone. 5 Certain state supreme courts-Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Massarequested the item veto in his 1992 State of the Union Message. See We Are Going to Lift This
Nation Out of Hard Times, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1992, at A14. The Senate subsequently considered
and rejected Bush's request. See Helen Dewar et al., Senate Rejects Line Item Veto, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 1992, at A14. President Clinton, who, like Ronald Reagan, wielded the item veto when he
was a state governor, has also indicated he will seek the item veto power. See Mark Stencel, Clinton's
Pledges, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at A19.
3. RONALD C. MOE, PROSPECTS FOR THE ITEM VETO AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL: LESSONS

FROM THE STATES 32 n.75 (1988).

4. Item veto decisions by state high courts from 1985 through 1990 include: Harbor v.
Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1298-99 (Cal. 1987) (governor not empowered to determine what is
vetoable line item under "single-subject" rule); Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371,
1384-85 (Colo. 1985) (state constitution only permits governor to veto "distinct items" in appropriation bill); University of Connecticut Chapter AAUP v. Governor, 512 A.2d 152, 156 (Conn. 1986)
(governor's statutory power to reduce particular "item" of allotment by 5% in appropriations bill
does not have effect of "veto" and is not unconstitutional); Florida House of Representatives v.
Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839, 845-46 (Fla. 1990) (state constitution prohibits governor from exercising
partial veto by vetoing one of several funding sources for single purpose); Martinez v. Florida Legislature, 542 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. 1989) (governor may not veto summary statement of intent and
legislative working papers that accompany appropriations bill); Thompson v. Graham, 481 So. 2d
1212, 1215 (Fla. 1985) (governor may veto line items of general appropriation bill but may not alter
legislative intent); Board of Trustees v. Burris, 515 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (Il1. 1987) (due to governor's
item veto of appropriation, state controller may not disburse funds for state scholarship program);
Junkins v. Branstad, 448 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 1989) (judicial retirement bill appropriation bill
subject to governor's item veto); Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 190-93 (Iowa 1985) (state
constitution permits governor to veto words and phrases in "riders," i.e., unrelated pieces of legislation incorporated into appropriation bill); Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1985) (state
constitution does not permit governor to veto qualifications on appropriations); State ex rel. Coil v.
Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (N.M. 1988) (state constitution permits governor to veto provisions, conditions, limitations, and any other "parts" of appropriations bills that intrude on executive
managerial function); Lipscomb v. State, 753 P.2d 939, 943-47 (Or. 1988) (governor may veto emergency clause in nonappropriation bills); Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 763
P.2d 442, 448-49 (Wash. 1988) (state constitution permits governor to veto "entire sections" of
nonappropriations bills); State ex rel.
Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 397-99 (Wis.
1988) (state constitution authorizes governor to exercise partial veto by vetoing individual letters,
words, phrases, and digits from budget bill). For an additional 11 state item veto decisions for 1991
and 1992, see infra note 5.
5. See Hunt v. Hubbert, 588 So. 2d 848, 859 (Ala. 1991) (governor may not exercise line item
veto after legislature has adjourned); Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 31 (Ariz. 1992) (governor may
veto line items but may not alter appropriations amounts); Romer v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 840
P.2d 1081, 1084 (Colo. 1992) (governor must comply with constitutional requirement that bills be
returned "with objections" for item veto to be valid); AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484
N.W.2d 390, 395-96 (Iowa 1992) (governor's item veto on provision in appropriation bill does not
erase state's underlying contractual obligation); Welsh v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Iowa
1991) (invalidating two item vetoes but sustaining the third); Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 586
N.E.2d 958, 960 (Mass. 1992) (state constitution permits governor not only to disapprove money
appropriations, but also to reduce them in amount); Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d 504, 507-08
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chusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin-have repeatedly wrestled with disputes
over the scope and interpretation of the item veto.6 The item veto, thus, is an
important aspect of state constitutional law in a number of states.
The volume of item veto litigation, however, is not necessarily a sign of a
healthy state constitutional discourse. 7 Rather, the very number of litigated
cases indicates that even after decades of experience many critical issues in the
interpretation of the item veto remain unresolved.8 The item veto alters the
(Mass. 1991) (governor may reduce sum of money appropriated or disapprove appropriation entirely, but may not change nonmonetary terms of appropriations); Inter Faculty Org. v. Carlson, 478
N.W.2d 192, 194-97 (Minn. 1991) (governor's power to veto to be narrowly construed and confined
to entire "items"); State ex rel. Sikeston R-VI Sch. Dist. v. Ashcroft, 828 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Mo.
1992) (permitting governor to allocate portion of appropriated funds to new programs pursuant to
federal court orders for desegregation, provided total appropriation to public school system not altered); Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698-99 (Okla. 1991) (governor may not exercise "partial
veto" over nonappropriation portions of multi-subject bill).
6. Over the last two decades there have been four major item veto cases in Colorado, four in
Florida, seven in Iowa, five in Massachusetts, three in Washington, and three in Wisconsin. In addition to the cases cited in notes 4 and 5, supra, see Anderson v. Lamm, 579 P.2d 620, 628-29 (Colo.
1978) (governor may properly veto substantive portions of appropriation bill, even individual footnotes, where such portions interfered with executive's administrative authority); Brown v. Firestone,
382 So. 2d 654, 671 (Fla. 1980) (governor may veto specific approprations, not qualifications or
restrictions on appropriations); Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 713-14 (Iowa 1975) (governor may
not veto lawful qualifications upon appropriations under item veto amendment); State ex rel. Turner
v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 152 (Iowa 1971) (appropriation that combines
purpose and amount constitutes entire "item" that may be properly vetoed by governor); Opinion of
the Justices, 428 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 1981) (governor may not constitutionally veto portions of
bill that are "inseparable" and have effect of altering remainder's legislative goals); Attorney Gen. v.
Administrative Justice, 427 N.E.2d 735 (Mass. 1981) (governor may not separate monetary appropriation items from accompanying restrictions or conditions for purposes of veto power); Opinion of
the Justices, 425 N.E.2d 750, 753-54 (Mass. 1981) (governor may treat any separable provision
attached to general appropriation bill as "item" for purposes of veto power); Washington Fed'n of
State Employees v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 874-75 (Wash. 1984) (former judicial test of item veto
validity abandoned; governor free to veto sections of enactment or appropriation items without judicial review); Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 564 P.2d 788, 791 (Wash. 1977)
(governor may not veto sections of bill if such veto would substantially alter scope of remaining
sections), overruled by Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 682 P.2d 869 (Wash. 1984);
State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 264 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Wis. 1978) (governor may exercise partial
veto, even though bill's policy is thereby altered, provided remaining portions of appropriations bill
constituted "complete and workable" law); State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 237 N.W.2d 910, 918
(Wis. 1976) (governor may veto portions of items in appropriations bill, provided they are "separable
provisions").
In addition, Florida and Wisconsin have modified their item veto provisions in response to
certain state supreme court decisions. See FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 8(a) (amended in 1968 in response
to Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1960)); WIs. CONST. art. V, § 10 (amended in 1990 in response to State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1988)).
7. But see Gardner, supra note 1, at 778-805 (dearth of state judicial decisions interpreting state
constitutional decisions indicates impoverished state constitutional discourse).
8. In its two most recent item veto cases, the Supreme Court of Washington repudiated the two
doctrines that had governed its item veto decision-making during the first seven decades of this
century. See Washington State Motorcycle DealersAss'n, 763 P.2d at 449; Washington Fed'n of State
Employees, 682 P.2d at 784. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also recently overturned a leading
item veto precedent. See Johnson, 819 P.2d at 699.
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balance of constitutional authority between a governor and a legislature, yet
many state courts either fail to recognize this or are unable to articulate a vision
of executive-legislative relations that adequately incorporates the changes affected by the item veto. Some state judges find the item veto to be a deviation
from the standard federal constitutional "model" of executive-legislative relations, and, as a result, interpret the item veto grudgingly, rather than see it as
constitutive of a separation of powers that differs from the federal norm. 9 At the
opposite extreme, one state supreme court has construed the item veto to give
the governor enormous powers to modify legislation.t 0 Many courts reluctantly
find themselves umpiring disputes between the political branches and engaging
in highly fact-specific balancing that fails to provide clear guidance for the resolution of future disputes. "
These state court difficulties are rooted in the two basic conceptual components of the item veto: the notion of an "item" and the often uncertain definition
of an "appropriations bill."
The use of the item veto assumes that a bill is composed of separable parts,
some of which a governor may subtract after the legislature has passed the bill
without doing violence to the idea that the bill is still the legislature's product.
There is, however, no obvious definition of an "item;" that is, there is often no
easy way to determine whether a particular provision of a bill is itself a freestanding item and not an inseparable part of a larger item. Moreover, legislation
is not just a matter of cobbling together discrete provisions into a bill. It is a
process of negotiation and compromise in which the votes essential to the passage of a bill are attained by tying different elements together or by modifying
minority proposals with new provisions, conditions, or restrictions until there is
a majority ready to support the result. By putting asunder what the legislature
has put together, the item veto results in laws that the legislature never passed.
As a result, the item veto poses a profound challenge to the view of legislation as
the domain of the legislature.
The limitation of the item veto to appropriations bills might appear to be
capable of more straightforward application, but the increased complexity of
state finances often makes the determination of what is an appropriations bill a
knotty problem. At a time when state finances rely heavily on standing appro9. See, e.g., Hunt, 588 So. 2d at 864 (Houston, J., concurring) (item veto intended to be "narrowly or strictly construed so as not to thwart the lawmaking powers of the legislative department");
Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1383 (Colo. 1985) (item veto "in derogation of
the general plan of state government"); Thompson v. Graham, 481 So. 2d 1212, 1220 (Fla. 1985)
(Ehrlich, J., dissenting) (item veto "deviati[on] from the normal system of checks and balances").
10. See, e.g., Mary E. Burke, Comment, The Wisconsin Partial Veto: Past, Present and Future,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 1395, 1416-18 (Wisconsin's current interpretation grants broad and expansive
partial veto powers to governor, even where veto's effect changes policy).
11. See, e.g., Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1380 (Colo. 1985) ("In broad
outline, it is the province of the general assembly to enact legislation and the province of the executive to see that the laws are faithfully executed.... The delineation of the dividing line between these
powers is often difficult, and must be accomplished on a case-by-case basis."); Brown v. Firestone,
382 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1980) ("Our task here is to define and delimit the relationship between the
gubernatorial veto power and the legislature's authority .... ").
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priations, earmarked taxes, and revolving funds, it is often unclear whether legislation providing for the payment of the proceeds of a special tax into a particular
fund, changing the distribution of earmarked taxes, making other interfund
transfers, or altering the formula in an intergovernmental assistance program is
an appropriation or general legislation. Even when a particular measure is
clearly an appropriation it may be debatable whether a bill that combines appropriations and non-appropriations measures is an appropriations bill for item veto
purposes.
This article considers the state courts' experience with the item veto. Part I
sketches the origins and basic elements of the item veto and its relationship to
other structural features of state governments. Parts II and III deal with two
central issues of interpretation in state item veto litigation-the definition of an
item and the definition of an appropriation bill. I suggest that in defining the
scope of "item" and "appropriations bill," state courts are frequently influenced
by the federal model of the proper balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches in the enactment of legislation, even though the item veto
alters that balance and changes the division of executive and legislative responsibilities. Conflicting opinions, shifting doctrines, and ad hoc decision-making
may be the inevitable result.
I. THE ITEM VETO AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

A. State Item Veto Provisions
The item veto, or partial veto, enables an executive to disapprove part of a
bill while allowing the rest of it to become law. Although the exact language of
the item veto differs from state to state, a typical provision is in the Arkansas
Constitution:
The Governor shall have the power to disapprove any item or
items of any bill making appropriation of money, embracing distinct
items; and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law; and
the item or items of appropriations shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations
prescribed for the passage of other
2
bills over the executive veto.t
Forty-three states provide for the item veto, including every state admitted
to the Union since the Civil War and every state but one west of the Mississippi.' 3 In forty-two of those states, the item veto is limited to bills making
appropriations;1 4 in Washington, the Governor enjoys the power of partial veto
12. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
13. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 49-50 (1992-

1993 ed.). The only states without the item veto are Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont. North Carolina makes no .provision for any form of
gubernatorial veto. Id.
14. Several state courts have emphasized that the governor can wield the item veto only on bills
containing more than one item of appropriation. See, e.g., Perry v. Decker, 457 A.2d 357, 360 (Del.
1983) (state constitution confers veto power only where bill contains more than one "distinct" item
of appropriation of money); Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Idaho 1978) (court would

1176

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

with respect to all legislation.1 5 At least ten states allow governors to reduce as
well as to disapprove items.1 6 Many states permit governors to veto general
legislation that the legislature has incorporated in an appropriations bill,
although other states limit the item veto to monetary items. 1 7 As with other
gubernatorial vetoes, legislatures may seek to overturn the governor's action, but
in most states a two-thirds vote is required to nullify an item veto.1 s
The item veto dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century.
States first began to amend their constitutions to provide for an item veto of
appropriation bills in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. 19 By the eve of
not consider acts of general legislation containing one item of appropriation as "appropriation" bill
for purposes of line item veto); Regents of State Univ. v. Trapp, 113 P. 910 (Okla. 1911).
15. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12. As a result of an amendment to this section, adopted in 1974,
the Governor's power is more expansive with respect to appropriations than non-appropriations
items. The constitution authorizes the Governor to "object to one or more sections or appropriations
items while approving other portions of the bill" but provides that the Governor may not object to
less than "an entire section, except that if the section contains one or more appropriation items he
may object to any such appropriation item or items." Id. What is a "section" for purposes of
Washington's section veto remains a subject of debate. See Washington State Motorcycle Dealers
Ass'n v. State, 763 P.2d 442, 448 (Wash. 1988).
16. There is some uncertainty in the figure because some state constitutions expressly grant
their governors the power to reduce items of appropriations, whereas in other states that power has
emerged as an interpretation of the governor's power to disapprove items. Constitutional grants of
the power to reduce may be found in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. See ALASKA CoNsT. art. II, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(e);
HAW. CONST. art. III, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(d); MASS. CONsT. art. LXIII, § 5; NEB.

CONST. art. IV, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. III, § 18; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(11). The New Jersey
Constitution authorizes the governor to "object in whole or in part" to items of appropriation. N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 1(15). The authorization has been held to include the power of reduction. Karcher
v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 416-17 (N.J. 1984). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that
the item veto includes the power to reduce. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Barnett, 48 A.
976 (Pa. 1901). But see Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 238 N.W. 16 (Mich. 1931) (governor lacks power
to reduce items under item veto provision that does not mention power to reduce). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court interpreted that state's item veto provision to allow the governor to veto digits in
appropriation items, thereby effecting reductions, but it has not decided whether the governor may
otherwise reduce items. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 396-97 &
n.17 (Wis. 1988).
17. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 425 N.E.2d 750, 753 (Mass. 1981) ("[T]he Governor may
treat as an 'item' any separable provision attached to the general appropriation bill.") and State ex
Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 152-53 (Iowa 1971) (noting Goverrel.
nor's ability to treat any separable provision of general appropriation bill as "item") with Jessen
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tex. 1975) (disallowing veto of nonmonetary item) and
State ex rel.
Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Mo. 1973) (same).
18. Of the 43 item veto states, 34 require a two-thirds vote for the legislature to override the
governor's action. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 13, at 49-50. In five
states, a three-fifths vote will suffice, and in four states the legislature may act by a simple majority.
Id.
19. The item veto was first established in the Constitution of the Confederate States of America,
although it was never exercised by the Confederate President. After the Civil War, it was immediately adopted by Georgia and Texas. See Roger H. Wells, The Item Veto and State Budget Reform,
18 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 782, 782-83 (1924).

1993]

THE ITEM VETO

1177

World War I thirty-six states had given their governors the item veto. 20 The last
state to adopt the item veto was Iowa, which added the provision to its constitution in 1968.21
B. The Item Veto in State ConstitutionalPerspective
The item veto represents the coming together of three widespread state constitutional policies: the rejection of legislative logrolling; the imposition of fiscal
restrictions on the legislature; and the strengthening of the governor's role in
budgetary matters. In other words, the item veto may be said to be at the confluence of the policies underlying the single-subject rule, the balanced budget
22
requirement, and the executive budget.
1. Anti-logrolling
Like the single-subject rule, the item veto grows out of the state constitutional effort to control logrolling, or the practice of adding together in a single
bill provisions supported by various legislators in order to create a legislative
majority. 23 In such a situation, no one provision may command majority support, but the total package will. A related phenomenon is the attachment of
minority provisions as legislative riders to bills enjoying majority support. In
this way, a measure which could not have passed on its own enjoys a free ride on
a more popular bill.
Most state constitutions seek to prevent logrolling by requiring legislatures
to limit bills to a single subject. 24 The single-subject requirements, however,
have largely failed to attain their intended purposes. The notion of a subject is
inherently incapable of precise definition. As Professor Lowenstein has observed, "what constitutes a 'subject' is a matter of choice based on considerations of convenience, rather than some objective demarcation of the human
mind.... [A]ny combination of concepts and things may appropriately be re20. See John A. Fairlie, The Veto Power ofthe State Governor, I1 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 473, 483
& n.20 (1917).

21. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 16.
22. See Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Iowa 1985) (purpose of item veto amendment to "balance proper legislative and executive powers with respect to the state budget" and to
expand governor's role in state budgetary process).
23. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hubbert, 588 So. 2d 848, 860 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., concurring) ("The

general purpose of giving the governor 'line item' veto power over appropriations bills, at least in
part, was to prevent 'logrolling,' a practice the framers of the 1901 Constitution attempted to preclude by other provisions of the 1901 Constitution, one being [the single subject rule.]"); State ex rel.
Coil v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383 (N.M. 1988) ("The major factors which prompted drafting

of constitutions to include the item-veto were.., most importantly, to prevent 'logrolling' tactics by
the legislature."); State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 269 (N.D. 1979) (purpose of item
veto to "prevent 'logrolling,' the practice of attaching riders of objectionable legislation to general
appropriation bills").

24. According to one recent survey, 42 states have single subject provisions in their constitutions; this includes 40 of the 43 states that have the item veto. See Nancy J. Townsend, Single
Subject Restrictions as an Alternative to the Line-Item Veto, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 227, 248 & n.75 (1985).
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garded as a 'subject' so long as there are people who find it expedient to so
classify them."'25 Lacking a clear definition of "single-subject" and reluctant to
intervene in the internal workings of the legislative process, courts have generally held that the single-subject rule is to be given a "liberal" interpretation and
have strained to uphold the constitutionality of most challenged measures.2 6
The invalidation of a state law for a violation of the single-subject rule is a
27
rarity.
Nevertheless, logrolling continues to be a cause for concern. Courts and
commentators have condemned the "practice of jumbling together in one act
inconsistent subjects in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular provisions could not pass on their separate merits."28 The standard critique is that by combining multiple subjects supported
by different interests into a single bill, logrolling impairs the quality of legislative
deliberation and erodes the executive veto. Unrelated measures cannot be considered on their individual merits; instead, some legislators are compelled to accept measures they would otherwise oppose in order to win support for the
measures they favor, while the governor may have to refrain from vetoing objectionable measures if those measures have been inserted into a bill containing
legislation the executive desires. 29 Logrolling is particularly prevalent with respect to matters that provide discrete benefits to narrower interest groups while
30
spreading the costs across the general public.
The item veto carries forward the anti-logrolling principle, but because it is
more limited than the single-subject rule in two ways it may be more effective.
First, the item veto is vested in the executive, a political actor. This both obviates the problem of having the courts pass on the political process and places the
power to enforce the single-subject concern in a state officer who is far more
likely to use it. Second, as noted, in every state but Washington the item veto is
25. Daniel H. Lowenstein, CaliforniaInitiativesand the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV.

936, 938-39 (1983).
26. See, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 214-15 (Ind. 1981) ("[I]f, from
the standpoint of legislative treatment, there is any reasonable basis for the grouping together in one
'act' of various matters, this court cannot say that such matters constitute more than one subject.").
27. See generally Millard Ruud, 'No Law Shall EmbraceMore Than One Subject,' 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389 (1958) (discussing history, use by litigants, and efficacy of one-subject rule for laws); see
also Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984) (same); Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290 (Cal.
1987) (same); Jessen Ass'n, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1975) (addressing interplay of
single-subject rule and item veto).
28. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 289 N.W. 662, 664 (Wis. 1940); see also Commonwealth v. Barnett, 48 A. 976, 977 (Pa. 1901) (bills, "popularly called 'omnibus bills,'" that "join[ed]
a number of different subjects in one bill... became a crying evil, not only from the confusion and
distraction of the legislative mind by the jumbling together of incongruous subjects, but still more by
the facility they afforded to corrupt combinations of minorities with different interests to force the
passage of bills with provisions which could never succeed if they stood on their separate merits").
29. See generally Townsend, supra note 24, at 232-42 (discussing woes of "logrolling" at federal level).
30. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 131-45

(1962) (examining benefits and consequences of "logrolling" within democratic, simple-majority
political system).
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limited to appropriations. Rather than block all omnibus measures, the item
veto focuses on the area most prone to pork barrel legislation and which the
states have concluded most needs protection against logrolling and riders-the
3
budgetary process. '
2. Balanced Budgets
Nearly all state constitutions require that state budgets be balanced. 32 The
item veto is closely associated with the effort to reduce state spending and balance state budgets. The spread of the item veto in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was a response to concerns that state legislatures were profligate with state revenues. The turn of the century was an era of rapidly growing
state spending, and the item veto, like the balanced budget requirement, was
intended to control state spending. The item veto would enable the governor to
control spending and meet the state constitutional requirement of a balanced
33
budget at the start of the fiscal year.
The actual role of the item veto in balancing budgets and holding down
state spending is uncertain. Empirical studies of the actual effects of the item
veto on the size of state budgets are few, and those that do exist have found that
the item veto is more commonly associated with partisan conflict, not fiscal restraint.34 Many item vetoes are based on policy considerations that have little
budgetary impact. 35 Indeed, some have suggested that the item veto actually
promotes legislative fiscal irresponsibility, with a legislator "tempted to bolster
himself politically by voting large sums of money to a popular cause" on the
assumption that the governor will do the politically unpopular task of vetoing or
reducing the appropriation. 36 Nonetheless, whatever the effect of the item veto
31. In addition, the single-subject rule was particularly ill-suited to policing logrolling in the
appropriations process. Modern budget practices seek to address state spending comprehensively in
one budget or general appropriations bill. By definition such a bill includes more than one subject;
indeed, it ought to include all subjects that are matters for state appropriation. As a result many
states exempt budget or appropriations bills from the single subject rule. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art
V, § 21. The item veto for appropriations bills in effect plugs this gap; multisubject appropriations
bills remain but the governor can consider each item within the bill separately.
32. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 13, at 355-56.
33. See Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 416 (N.J. 1984) ("The constitutional line-item veto
power serves the governmental need to have a balanced budget in place at the start of the fiscal
year.").
34. See, e.g., Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?,45 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 372, 373-76
(1985) (detailing results of 1982 mail survey that indicates item veto more commonly used for partisan purposes than for fiscal responsibility).
35. See James J. Gosling, Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292 (1986).
Gosling's study of the item veto in Wisconsin may be of limited applicability to other states since
under the Wisconsin case law the governor has unusually broad item veto powers and this may
permit its greater use on p6licy matters.

36. M. Nelson McGeary, The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 941, 943
(1947) (discussing how practice of veto discourages acceptance of responsibility by legislature); cf L.
Peter Schultz, An Item Veto: A ConstitutionalandPoliticalIrrelevancy, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 177, 186 (1985) (with federal item veto "Congress could act even more irresponsibly
than it does at present, packing appropriations bills with questionable items.... Then a congressman
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in practice, 37 its rationale is clearly linked to expenditure reduction and fiscal
balance.
3. Executive Budget
Even in the early twentieth century it was recognized that the item veto
'38
alone was "insufficient to cope with the mounting costs of state government."
Reformers urged an administrative reorganization of state fiscal practices. "The
outcome was a budget reform movement which swept the country and led to the
enactment of budgetary legislation in forty-seven states."' 39 The centerpiece of
reform was the executive budget. Most states, either by constitutional provision
or by statute, give the governor a central role in the budget process. The governor is usually responsible for submitting a budget to the legislature, and for carrying out budgetary goals once the budget is adopted. 40 The turn to the
executive reflected the view that governors have the greater institutional motivation and capacity for achieving fiscal restraint. Legislators represent local constituencies and may be more likely to seek state tax dollars for local projects.
The competition among local legislators for state moneys tends to drive up the
overall size of the state budget. Governors may be more likely to seek state-wide
budget goals and hold down the size of the budget because they answer to a
state-wide constituency and are in a better position to assess the impact of
spending measures on the state budget.
The item veto fits in with the executive budget structure and the balanced
budget goal. 4 1 Under the executive budget systems in most states, the governor
submits a budget plan to the state legislature. 4 2 The legislature must act by a
certain date. If the legislature adds to the governor's budget, the governor may
veto those items. The item veto makes it more difficult for the legislature to
depart from the governor's spending plan. 43 Moreover, on the assumption that
could tell his constituents that he had promoted a certain project, only to have it vetoed by the
President").
37. One recent study found that the item veto tends to lower state expenditures, but only when
the governor and the majority in the state legislature belong to different political parties. See James
Aim & Mark Evers, The Item Veto and State Government Expenditures, 68 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1991).
38. Wells, supra note 19, at 786.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 13, at 49-50.
41. Wells, supra note 19, at 782-83. As Roger Wells notes, the Confederacy's initiation of the
item veto was accompanied by a requirement that proposals for expenditure must originate with the
President. "To defend his budget estimates, the [Confederate] President was given the item veto.

These provisions were intended to be a compromise between English financial procedures and prevailing American practice. Thus, at the outset, the item veto was associated with the idea of an
executive budget." Id. at 782-83.
42. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. V, §§ 18-20; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2-6.
43. See Wells, supra note 19, at 787. The presence of balanced budget requirements, executive
budget structures, and single-subject rules at the state level may blunt the criticism of the item veto
as a failed expenditure reduction device since, given these other structural features of state government, "the item veto at the state level is a supplemental rather than a primary budget-cutting tool."
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
385, 431 (1992).
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the governor has submitted a balanced budget plan, the item veto enables the
governor to maintain a balanced budget after the legislature has acted. The governor's authority is by no means absolute, since in every state the legislature can
override gubernatorial item vetoes, usually by a two-thirds vote. But the item
veto conforms to the judgment of most states of shifting the balance of power
towards the governor with respect to appropriations."
The executive budget's simultaneous assumption of and provision for the
primacy of the governor in fiscal matters was consistent with the traditionally
limited institutional capacity of most state legislatures. Until three decades ago,
state legislatures "were generally considered 18th century relics" with "little or
no staff, and... heavily dependent on executive agencies and lobbyists for information."'4 5 Starting in the 1960s, however, most legislatures embarked on programs of modernization; added staff facilities, and sophisticated information and
data processing systems; and reformed internal procedures. With their new information-gathering and oversight capacities, legislatures have developed fiscal
expertise and "play an active role in reviewing and monitoring state budgets as
well as overseeing the operation of state agencies." 46 Enhanced legislative capacity has led to increased legislative activism. Legislatures are more inclined to
challenge gubernatorial budgetary priorities and to seek inclusion of legislative
initiatives in state budgets. Much as the item veto assumes an executive-centered vision of state budget-making, increased legislative activism in budgetary
matters has led to conflict and to the current upsurge in state item veto
47
litigation.
II.

DEFINING THE ITEM

A. The Problem
The item veto authorizes a governor to veto an "item" of a bill without
vetoing the bill. But just what is an "item?" What part or parts of a bill are
sufficiently discrete that they may be separated from the other parts and taken
out of the bill without doing violence to the legislative process and legislative
compromises that gave rise to the initial bill? This is a problem that the federal
system does not face since the President can veto a whole bill only, and not a
44. See Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 406 (N.J. 1984) (governor's authority to propose
budget and power to veto selectively confer significant responsibility for state's fiscal affairs and are
essential to "efficient modem system of government").
45. Rich Jones, The State Legislatures,in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note
13, at 108.
46. Rich Jones, The State Legislatures,in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note
13, at 109.
47. See, e.g., Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be
Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 184-85 (1986) (because item veto used more to
accomplish political aims than to reduce budget, vetoes trigger numerous political battles and legislative challenges of gubernatorial vetos); Stephen Masciocchi, Comment, The Item Veto Power in
Washington, 64 WASH. L. REV. 891, 893 (1989) (distrust of executive authority in 1970s has led to
resurgence of legislation, court challenges to item vetoes, and several amendments to constitutional
item veto provisions).
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part of a bill. 48 The item veto enables a governor to consider the parts of a bill
separately, approving some and disapproving others. It, thus, empowers the executive to enact into law a measure that differs from the one the legislature
passed. This works a major departure from the traditional separation of executive and legislative functions. The definition of a vetoable item, thus, raises a
serious conceptual problem.
Disputes over whether a provision that a governor has sought to veto is in
fact a vetoable item usually take two forms. The legislature and governor may
disagree over the level of specificity at which the governor may wield his veto
power. And the governor and legislature may clash over whether a non-monetary provision in an appropriations bill constitutes a discrete item or is inseparably wedded to an appropriation. Both conflicts grow out of the essential
indeterminacy of the notion of an item.
To illustrate the problem of the level of specificity at which the item veto is
to be used, a hypothetical may be instructive. Within the context of a state's
education budget, may the governor veto the line appropriating funds for salaries for administrators at a specific four-year college, or is the proper item the
entire appropriation for salaries at the college, the entire appropriation for that
college, the entire appropriation for all four-year colleges, or the entire appropriation for higher education? Is the budgetary appropriation for higher education
to be treated as a single item, with all the sub-items seen as inseparable parts of
an overall legislative funding plan, so that (in the absence of the power to reduce) the governor must veto either all of it or none of it?4 9 Or, if the budget
makes more detailed specifications, may the governor apply the item veto at any
level of detail she chooses? 50
Generally, if the legislature has made the more detailed specifications of
appropriations, and it has not made the more general appropriation contingent
on the more specific ones (or made the specific appropriations contingent on
each other), the courts have allowed governors to apply the item veto to the
more specific and smaller dollar items. However, courts have not always given
clear guidance as to how specific the itemization in an appropriations bill must
be.
Although some courts have recognized that inadequate itemization would
48. Some have suggested that the President may have the item veto power when Congress has
aggregated unrelated subjects into a single bill. See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith,
Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe & Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 449-52 (1990)
("subject veto" addresses legislative "logrolling" and arguably restores veto power to scope intended
by framers of Constitution).
49. See Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127-31 (Va. 1940) (legislative provisions
enabling attorney general to hire special counsel, creating position of Legislative Director of Budget,
and placing restrictions or conditions on specific appropriations not "items" that governor can veto
as they are inseparable parts of budgetary plan).
50. See, e.g., Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 1960) (overturning lower court and allowing governor to veto appropriation for two specific salaries within overall appropriation for wages
and salaries); Brault v. Holleman, 230 S.E.2d 238, 244-45 (Va. 1976) (governor may veto sub-item
of state aid for capital costs of metro rail without vetoing full item of state aid to Northern Virginia
Transportation Commission).
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undo the item veto power and have permitted sub-item vetoes despite the lumping of items by the legislature, 51 others have been reluctant to allow the governor to veto parts of what the legislature has determined to be a single, broader
item. 52 Moreover, where legislatures expressly provide that the more general
appropriation requires the allocation of specified funds to a particular sub-item,
courts have often treated the more general appropriation and the more specific
allocation as one item and have precluded the governor from vetoing the more
53
specific sub-item.
The dilemma posed by the express conditioning of a general appropriation
on a specific allocation of that appropriation may also be seen as an instance of
the other major item definition problem-the relationship of the vetoed provision to the rest of the bill. Where one section of a bill is intertwined with another, the governor, by vetoing one section, may render a non-vetoed section
meaningless or ineffective. 54 More commonly, the issue arises when the governor seeks to veto language within a bill section, such as a condition, restriction,
or other proviso placed in an appropriation. Here the issue often is not simply
the amount of state funds to be spent on a particular program but how that
program will be implemented, or how the agency responsible for the program
will be operated. Instances of legislative efforts to incorporate policy or administrative directives into an appropriation are manifold and diverse. For example,
funds might be appropriated for the Department of Corrections "provided"
prison overcrowding is reduced. 55 Funds for an agency might be made contingent on consultation with or review by a particular legislative committee before
51. See Green, 122 So. 2d at 15-17 (definition of "item" in terms of smaller appropriation motivated in part by need to avoid legislative evasion of item veto authority); Fairfield v. Foster, 214 P.
319, 323 (Ariz. 1923) (if legislature permitted to consolidate "items" and to "direct" how money is
spent, governor's veto power nullified); People ex rel. State Bd. of Agriculture v. Brady, 115 N.E.
204, 207 (Ill. 1917) (governor has power to veto items that are separate and distinct entries); see also
People v. Tremaine, 21 N.E.2d 891, 894-96 (N.Y. 1939) (lump sum appropriations violate spirit of
state constitutional requirement of itemization).
52. See, e.g., Florida House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839, 844-46 (Fla. 1990)
(governor must veto entire appropriation; cannot modify or reduce); Regents of the State Univ. v.
Trapp, 113 P. 910 (Okla 1911) ("item" applies to general appropriation that must be wholly approved or rejected, not to specific objects and amounts); Fulmore v. Lane, 140 S.W. 405, 421 (Tex.
1911) (appropriation language preceding group of items evidence legislature's intent to consider
group as one appropriation).
53. See Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d 117, 122-23 (Mass. 1981) (governor could not veto
part of item because legislature decides level of funding; governor may only disapprove or reduce
entire item).
54. See, e.g., State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 270-71 (N.D. 1979) (governor could
not veto section of bill because veto would destroy purpose and meaning); Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127-31 (Va. 1940) (legislative provision enabling attorney to have special counsel
essential to office and "interlocked" with successful administration so cannot be vetoed by governor).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 658, 668 (Fla. 1980) (governor's veto of
conditional proviso invalid because no identifiable fund in proviso); cf. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa
State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148-50 (Iowa 1971) (appropriation to highway commission with proviso barring relocation of highway engineers' offices did not constitute appropriation
nor direct method of use).
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appropriated funds are actually expended. 56 An appropriation might be made
the basis of an administrative restructuring of the agency to be funded.5 7 An
appropriation might provide that funds for the appropriation must come from a
specified source. 58 In some instances, legislative provisos test the bounds of germaneness by conditioning an expenditure on a state action not clearly related to
the purpose of the appropriation. 59
In each of these examples, the legislature sought to use the appropriation to
leverage an administrative or policy decision. In wielding the item veto, the
governor sought to obtain the appropriation without being bound by the legislature's accompanying policy determination. The legislative actions raise the
specter of the inappropriate combination of discrete policies in a single measure,
that is, logrolling. But the governor's effort to sever an appropriation from the
accompanying condition is an attempt to enact into law a provision the legislature never approved, and can be seen as an intrusion of executive power into the
legislature's domain.
B. Three Approaches to Resolving the Legislative-Executive Conflict
Each case concerning the proper definition of a vetoable item implicates all
three branches of state government. There is the direct clash between the executive and the legislature: the greater the discretion of the governor to excise bill
language from the surrounding text, the greater is her power to shape the law
enacted; conversely, the more the legislature may insist that elements in a bill
are intertwined and that the governor can veto larger portions only, the more
the legislature can determine budgetary policy and use the budget to attain other
policy goals. The role of the judiciary is more subtle. In each case, the court
must consider not only the proper balance of power between the executive and
the legislature, but also how deeply judges ought to get involved in these conflicts between the political branches.
The state item veto decisions resist easy classification. Courts within a
given state vary in their approach to the item veto over time and in different
contexts. Nevertheless, at the risk of enormous oversimplification, I will organize the case law around three general approaches.
The first tends to favor the legislature, either by limiting the portions of an
appropriations bill that a governor can veto, or by assimilating the item veto to
the traditional executive veto in order to limit the governor's ability to disaggre56. See, e.g., State ex rel. Coil v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380, 1385 (N.M. 1988) (legislative
requirement that district attorney not use funds to purchase automated data processing or word
processing equipment reasonable condition on appropriation and may not be vetoed by governor).
57. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Administrative Justice, 427 N.E.2d 735, 735-39 (Mass. 1981).
58. See, e.g., Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1384-85 (Colo. 1985) (restrictions on funding sources not separate items and could not be vetoed without vetoing remainder of
items); Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d 504, 511 (Mass. 1991) (governor may not change specified funding source to general one, but may veto item that establishes funding source).
59. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d at 510 (proviso intended to make changes in
membership, operation, and deposit insurance coverage of Deposit Insurance Fund inserted into
appropriation for office of Commissioner of Banks, who did not operate Fund).
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gate the legislative compromises incorporated in a bill. In effect, the court will
defer to the legislature's determination of how the portions of a bill fit together
and whether two arguably severable provisions are really one item. This approach generates relatively predictable case law, but fails to appreciate how the
item veto differs from the traditional veto and thereby erodes the item veto's
anti-logrolling function.
The second approach relies on some of the basic conceptual assumptions of
the first and seeks to maintain the legislature's primacy in determining the structure and contents of legislative bills, but recognizes that the historic purpose of
the item veto was to enhance the executive's role and to empower the governor
to undo some of the linkages of material within a bill. Courts pursuing this
approach seek an ongoing reconciliation of executive and legislative prerogatives, but the balance struck by particular courts will often seem arbitrary, and
the lack of consistency in judicial decisions increases the likelihood of future
litigated conflicts.
The third, and least common, approach is to give the executive broad authority to determine the contours of a vetoable item. Like deference to the legislature, this approach raises the possibility of consistent, categorical decisionmaking. It also advances the item veto's historic purpose of enabling the governor to undo legislative logrolling. On the other hand, it dramatically shifts the
balance of power between the legislature and the executive and gives the governor considerable capability to engage in unilateral law-making. An executivecentered approach to the definition of an item may follow from the logic of the
item veto, but it is such a departure from the traditional approach to separation
of powers that it has taken root in only one state-Wisconsin-and even there it
has been the focus of considerable controversy.
1. The "Negative" Item Veto
Some courts have sought to avoid the difficulty of defining an item by
adopting relatively mechanical rules that limit the scope of the item veto. Thus,
some courts restrict the item veto to monetary items so that nonmonetary language may not be vetoed, 6° or accept the legislature's definition of bill sections,
so that the governor could never break up a legislative section. 6 1 These rules
certainly curtail the number of disputes-although conflicts over the level of
specificity at which the veto may be wielded would still remain-but they do so
in a manner that endangers the item veto's purpose of giving the governor authority to unbundle appropriations measures and undertake a separate review
and determination concerning every appropriation. A definition of an item
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 631 P.2d 668, 672 (Kan. 1981) (governor may not
veto section of appropriations bill that is not "an item of appropriation of money"); In re Opinion of
the Justices, 2 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Mass. 1936) (words and phrases not "items or parts of items"). The
Massachusetts court subsequently abandoned this position in Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d
117, 120-23 (Mass. 1981).

61. Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 763 P.2d 442, 443-49 (Wash. 1988)
(constitutional amendment prohibits governor from vetoing "less than entire section of nonappropriation bill").
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keyed to monetary amounts or section signs in a bill invites legislators to combine different appropriations or appropriations and conditions on those appropriations in the same section of a bill, or to resort to lump sum appropriations.
This legislative response to a narrow judicial interpretation of the notion of
"item" would limit the governor to the choice of signing or vetoing an entire
multi-part appropriation or an appropriation that combines funding with policy
language or administrative directives. Indeed, as one empirical study found,
such clever legislative drafting has limited the efficacy of the item veto in many
62
states.
Most state courts permit governors to veto nonmonetary words and
phrases, but the dominant judicial analytical framework for considering the relationship of nonmonetary conditions and restrictions to the underlying appropriations continues to favor the legislature and to cabin the effect of the item veto
on executive-legislative relations. For many courts, the critical distinction is between gubernatorial actions that are "negative," that is, those that block the
enactment of legislation, and those that are "affirmative" or create new legislation. Consistent with the traditional relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government, the governor's use of the item veto must be
negative, not affirmative. As one state supreme court put it,
The power of partial veto is the power to disapprove. This is a
negative power, or a power to delete or destroy a part or item, and is
not a positive power, or a power to alter, enlarge or increase the effect
of the remaining parts or items. It is not the power to enact or create
new legislation by selective deletions ....

Thus, a partial veto must be

so exercised that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part
or does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create legislation
by the careful strikinconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature,
63
ing of words, phrases, clauses, or sentences.
The "affirmative/negative" test assumes that the affirmative/negative distinction can be drawn in theory, that courts can do so in practice, and that the
distinction is consistent with the purposes of the item veto. It derives its appeal
from the notion that the traditional role of the gubernatorial veto was wholly
negative, with affirmative lawmaking solely a matter for the legislature. It reflects the view that either the item veto is really only a special case of the general
gubernatorial veto, and not something different, and so should be interpreted
accordingly; or, rather, that the item veto is an unwise "exception to the separation of powers otherwise required... and ...

in derogation of the general plan

62. See Abney & Lauth, supra note 34, at 373 ("Sixteen of the 37 respondents from states
having the item veto reported that legislatures write appropriations acts so as to limit the item veto
opportunities for the governor.").
63. State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (N.M. 1974) (citations omitted); see
also Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1382-83 (Colo. 1985) (item veto "merely a
negative legislative power" vesting governor with authority "to nullify but not to create statutes");

Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 664 (Fla. 1980) (veto power intended to be negative power, "to
nullify, or at least suspend, legislative intent" not "to alter or amend legislative intent"); Inter
Faculty Org. v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Minn. 1991) (item veto gives governor "negative
authority, not a creative one.., to strike, not to add to or even to modify the legislative strategy").
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of state government" 64 and as such ought to be "narrowly construed to prevent
an unwarranted usurpation by the executive of powers granted the legislature in
'65
the first instance."
The affirmative/negative test fails to recognize just how different the item
veto is from the traditional executive veto. The traditional executive veto can be
characterized as wholly "negative." A president or governor can prevent a legislative measure from becoming law, but cannot change any aspect of the measure
that the legislature passed and cannot sign into law anything that the legislature
has not already approved. Although in some circumstances this veto might be
said to have "affirmative" attributes-e.g., when the executive vetoes a bill necessary to prevent an existing law from lapsing-the executive is not creating any
66
new law that had not previously passed both chambers of the legislature.
The item veto, however, is quite different. Every time the governor wields
the item veto, even in the most non -controversial setting, the governor is acting
affirmatively. To veto an item and approve the remainder of a bill is always to
enact a piece of legislation that the legislature had not approved. A bill missing
an item that was in the bill the legislature passed is a different bill from the one
the legislature passed. The "negative" instances of the item veto are a null set.
The judicial proponents of the affirmative/negative test, of course, assume
that there will be many "negative" item vetoes, especially the vetoes of discrete
monetary items which the item veto was plainly intended to allow. To find these
vetoes to be "negative," judges implicitly rely on the proposition that the greater
includes the lesser, that is, that the legislature that passed the bill-with-the-vetoed-item simultaneously passed the bill-without-the-vetoed-item. But it is not
always the case that the legislature would have passed the bill without the vetoed
item. The vetoed item may have been essential to win the approval of some
member or group of members whose support may have been necessary to advance the bill, or other, non-vetoed items in the bill, at some critical stage in the
legislative process. The vetoed item may have been vital to getting the bill out of
committee or to winning majority support on the floor of one legislative
chamber.
Legislation is a mechanism for the transmission of individual preferences
over a wide range of issues into the collective choice of the legislature as a whole.
The very process of reaching a collective preference affects the outcome. As one
commentator has observed, "[sitatutes are ... the vector sum of political forces
64. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1383.
65. Inter Faculty Org., 478 N.W.2d at 194.
66. The executive's veto may have an affirmative lawmaking function in a different sense: by
threatening to veto a legislative bill unless the legislature also passes measures she favors, the executive can leverage the authority to veto into the power to make laws. Indeed, a skillful executive can
wield the veto threat to have a substantial effect on the shape of legislative measures. Nevertheless,
there is a significant formal difference in the "affirmative" lawmaking potential of the two types of
vetoes. With an executive limited to the traditional all-or-nothing veto, the legislature may choose
not to give in to the executive's pressure and instead accept the veto, in which case no new laweither the legislature's or the executive's-is enacted. In the item veto case, the governor's action
automatically creates a new law unless the legislature is able to summon up the supermajority necessary to override the veto.
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expressed through some institutional matrix which has had profound, but proba'67
bly unpredictable and untraceable, effects on the policies actually expressed."
Every bill emerges from a unique path marked by internal procedures, preliminary votes, leadership decisions, and political contingencies. "The winning majority consists of many legislators; their respective reasons for voting against the
status quo may well be as varied as their number."' 68 There is simply no way of
knowing, as a general matter, if a particular bill would have passed had the
legislators been advised at the outset that a particular item would be vetoed.
The bill as a whole commanded a legislative majority; the bill without the vetoed
item might have been supported by a minority. Thus, every item veto may, in
theory, be a creative act, effectuating an affirmative change in the law.
To work, the affirmative/negative test requires a way of distinguishing
those vetoes that produce a law that the legislature would have passed anywaya truly "negative" veto-from those that undo a compromise or remove a provision essential to the affirmative vote of a critical legislator or group of legislators
and thereby enact a law that the legislature would not have passed. One possible
method of implementing the affirmative/negative test is to review closely the
legislative procedure, votes, bargaining, and compromises that led to passage of
the bill. But the legislative process is multi-faceted and marked by complex interactions, strategic behavior, and unrecorded subjective judgments by critical
legislative players. The difficulties inherent in unpacking the history of any bill
are compounded by the general paucity of legislative history materials at the
state level. It is no surprise that few courts are eager to engage in this timeconsuming and, often, ultimately fruitless enterprise.
The more common method of assessing legislative intent is to look at the
text of the legislation itself. Frequently, courts have determined that if the legislature fails to make an appropriation expressly contingent on the vetoed provision that provision may be treated as a separate item. 69 However, where the
legislation states that an appropriation is available "provided" that a nonmonetary provision is adhered to, or on "condition" of a specific restriction or compliance with a specific directive, then the legislature intends that the appropriation
and the nonmonetary language be treated as linked, and the governor's attempt
to veto the condition or proviso will be rejected as an invalid attempt to engage
in "affirmative" lawmaking. 70 Although this construction will sometimes lead
to judicial validation of gubernatorial item vetoes, legislators can quickly adapt
to the judicial rules and learn to place language of condition throughout their
67. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politicsand the Understandingof Public Law, 65 Cm.KENT L. REV. 123, 134 (1989).
68. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).

69. See Attorney General v. Administrative Justice, 427 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Mass. 1981) (veto of
words and phrases permitted where "Legislature did not use conditional or restrictive wording in the
disapproved provisions").
70. Compare Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710-14 (Iowa 1975) (provision expressed as
condition on appropriation may not be vetoed) with State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway
Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148-50 (Iowa 1971) (provision not express condition on appropriation
may be vetoed).
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appropriations. 7 As a result, a careful legislature will usually be able to craft
provisos that are considered to be inseparably linked to appropriations.
This careful drafting may be indicative of a legislative intent that an appropriation not become law without the concurrent enactment of a condition attached to it. But the logic of applying the affirmative/negative test to make
legislative intent the touchstone of the definition of an item is ultimately subversive of the item veto itself. On the theory that the affirmative/negative distinction is to be drawn according to the language of the bill, the legislature could
draft the bill so that every element in the bill is contingent on the enactment of
every other. In other words, the legislative intent would be that either all of the
bill becomes law or none of it does. A gubernatorial veto of an item in such a bill
would surely be affirmative lawmaking as it would alter legislative policy and
create a bill inconsistent with the professed intent of the legislature. But plainly
not permitting the governor to utilize the item veto on such a bill would render
the item veto a nullity.
The affirmative/negative test fails not simply because it is in tension with
the internal workings of the legislature in creating legislation, but because it
misses the change in the distribution of power between the executive and legislature that the item veto is designed to effect. To undo the perceived harmful
effects of legislative logrolling and to fortify the governor's primacy with respect
to budget matters, the item veto gives the governor the power of separate consideration with respect to the various elements in an appropriations bill. This allows the governor to escape from the Hobson's choice posed by the legislative
attachment of additional funding or undesirable conditions to the governor's
budget proposals. As a result, the item veto inevitably gives the governor an
affirmative power with respect to the creation of new legislation. The real question is not whether the governor's power is affirmative or negative, but, rather,
what affirmative power the item veto ought to create.
2. Of Conditions and Riders: Judicial Efforts to Balance Legislative and
Executive Prerogatives
The affirmative/negative distinction influences most state courts, although
judges applying this test tend to ignore the inevitably "affirmative" quality of
most item vetoes. If the legislature has paid careful attention to its drafting, this
approach precludes the governor from vetoing conditions or restrictions attached to appropriations. A number of courts, however, even when professing to
follow the affirmative/negative test, have looked past the language the legislature used to tie a condition to an appropriation and have sought to make a
substantive judgment as to whether the vetoed language could be severed from
the bill. These courts continue to hold that the governor may not sever a condition from the appropriation to which the legislature has attached it, but, con71. See Brent R. Appel, Item Veto Litigation in Iowa: Marking the BoundariesBetween Legislative and Executive Power, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 20 (1992) (interpreting Iowa Supreme Court as
holding legislature "to a demanding standard of drafting if it wished restrictions to be a part of an
item").
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cerned that the legislature may use careful drafting to erode the item veto, they
have found that the legislature's definition of what is a condition is not determinative. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it in one opinion,
although the vetoed language was "cast in conditional terms... skillful drafting
will not convert a separable piece of legislation to a restriction or condition on
the expenditure of an appropriation."'72 "Looking to the substance of the provi73
sions," the court found the vetoed language separable from the appropriation.
Courts pursuing this approach seek to find a middle path that will prevent
legislative circumvention of the veto authority without enabling the governor to
assume legislative power. Such a middle path would preserve the traditional primacy of the legislature with respect to lawmaking but would recognize that the
item veto represents a shift in power that enables the governor to disaggregate at
least some legislative provisions. But the attempt to hold together both the traditional balance of power and the enhanced position of the governor can result in a
zigzag course of decisions in which the judicial basis for permitting a veto in one
setting and disallowing it in another may be difficult to discern. The course of
the Iowa Supreme Court through five cases over two decades may be instructive.
In State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Commission ,74 the Iowa
court's first item veto case, the court held that the governor may veto nonmonetary items, and it sustained a veto of language inserted into the appropriation for
highways which prohibited the relocation of the offices of permanent resident
engineers. Consistent with the affirmative/negative approach, the court noted
that the legislature had failed to make the highway appropriation expressly contingent on the relocation prohibition. 75 By the next item veto decision four years
later in Welden v. Ray, 76 the legislature had learned its drafting lesson, and the
court invalidated the governor's vetoes of nonmonetary language that expressly
restricted or conditioned appropriations on spending practices of the agencies
77
funded by the appropriations.
78
Subsequently, over the votes of three dissenters, the court in Rush v. Ray
reiterated its position that the governor could not veto conditions on the use of
appropriated money. The close division in Rush, however, may have indicated
some discomfort with the affirmative/negative test. Rush concerned the veto of a
provision attached to five appropriations that sought to exclude those appropria72. Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Mass. 1981).
73. Id.
74. 186 N.W.2d 141, 148-50 (Iowa 1971).
75. Id. at 149. In dicta, the Turner court also indicated that the legislature would not be
permitted to evade the item veto by lumping all appropriations into one item. Id. at 152.
76. 229 N.W.2d 706, 710-14 (Iowa 1975).
77. Id. The vetoed language consisted, interalia, of legislative efforts to limit the percentage of
appropriated funds that could be allocated to any particular institution or program within an agency
budget and to limit the number of permanent full-time employees in the affected agencies. Id. at
707-09. The court found these clauses "to be integral parts of the appropriations themselves" and
thus "quite different" from the situation in Turner where the legislature had placed the appropriation in one bill section and the vetoed restriction on relocation of offices in a separate section. Id. at
714 (citing Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 150).
78. 362 N.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Iowa 1985).
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tions from the general statutory mechanism for the inter-agency transfer of appropriated funds under specified circumstances. 79 Although the majority found
that the governor's action would have made the appropriation "available for
purposes not authorized by the legislation as it was originally written" and
therefore was unconstitutional "affirmative" legislation by the governor, 80 the
governor's veto would have preserved the existing legislative framework for inter-agency transfers and was, thus, arguably a "negative" action. More importantly, the legislature sought to effectuate a general change in state fiscal
practices through provisos attached to appropriations. This compelled the governor to accept the proposed changes as the price for obtaining funding for state
agencies. If the legislature had passed a separate bill, the governor could have
considered the bill on its separate merits and vetoed it without risk to the appropriations. The provisos, thus, resembled the combination of appropriations and
general legislation that the item veto was intended to permit the governor to
undo.8 1 The Iowa court's heavy reliance on the bill's "condition" language,
thus, contributed to an erosion of the governor's item veto power.
Shortly thereafter, in Colton v. Branstad,8 2 the Iowa court added a new
twist to the affirmative/negative test when it held that the governor could veto a
condition attached to an appropriation if the condition were really only a
"rider." The provision in Colton was textual language attached to the appropriation to the State Department of Health that directed the Department to relinquish authority over certain federal grants to the State Family Planning
Council. 83 Although the directive explicitly stated that it was "a condition of
the appropriation," the Iowa court found that since the language did not "limit
or direct the use of that appropriation" it was not a "condition" at all but a
"contingency" or a "rider," and, thus, the governor could treat it as a discrete
vetoable item separate from the attached appropriation. 8 4 In effect, the court
treated the condition as a non-germane attachment-although the court also
noted that the condition was sufficiently related to the underlying appropriation
that the appropriation-rider combination did not run afoul of the state constitution's single-subject rule. 85 The court recognized that even if the spirit of the
affirmative/negative distinction were to guide its definition of vetoable items, the
need to protect the governor's item veto power meant that legislative drafting
alone could not determine the contours of a vetoable item:
The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in
79. Id. at 480.
80. Id. at 482-83.
81. Cf. Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 158 (La. 1977) ("The Governor's constitutional
power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the governor to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing 'items' of expenditure essential to the operation of a
government.").
82. 372 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1985).

83. Id. at 185-86.
84. Id. at 190-92.
85. Id. at 192.
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a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose
between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing
'items' of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The
legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive
veto. 86
The Iowa Supreme Court applied the "condition/rider" distinction six
years later in Welsh v. Branstad,8 7 when it considered the governor's veto of
language attached to an appropriation for tourism and export trade promotion
activities which provided "as a condition, limitation, and qualification, any official Iowa trade delegation led by the governor which receives financial or other
support from the appropriation in this subsection shall be represented by a bipartisan delegation." 8 8 Although the proviso used language of condition and
limitation and purported to affect the spending of the funds provided by the
appropriation, the court found it to be a vetoable rider because it did not affect
'89
"the amount or purpose of the appropriated funds."
The Iowa court's condition/rider distinction, as a reflection of its underlying goal of reconciling traditional legislative primacy over legislation with the
item veto's express grant of power to the governor to disaggregate bills and give
separate consideration to items, is well-intentioned but fraught with difficulty. 90
There is no obvious definition of a rider or clear distinction between a rider and
a condition. As one member of Congress recently observed, "riders are simply
amendments; they do not fall from the sky." 9 1 The courts that have sought to
follow the condition/rider distinction have yet to develop a test that clearly separates the former from the latter.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, for example, defined "riders" as measures
that are "inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill;"' 92 provisos
that "do not exhibit such a connexity [sic] with the appropriation of funds that
they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures."193 But what is "inappropriate" for an appropriation bill is a highly subjective judgment. Few legislatures
really limit their appropriations bills to the simple granting of funds to an
agency, or a specific unit within that agency, for a particular matter. The structure and operation of an agency could be established by general legislation; in86. Id. at 190-91.
87. 470 N.W.2d 644 (Iowa 1991).
88. Id. at 647.
89. Id. at 650.
90. Other courts attempting to pursue a similar condition/rider strategy appear to include Louisiana, see Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153 (La. 1977) (item in general appropriations bill requiring legislative approval prior to disbursment of funds); Massachusetts, see Opinion of the Justices,
582 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Mass. 1991) (governor may veto any separable item even if item does not
directly apportion money); and New Mexico, see State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380,
1384-85 (N.M. 1988) (restriction in general appropriation bill that funds could not be used for rental
of parking space deemed not "an item of appropriation" and item could be vetoed without vetoing
entire appropriation provision).
91. Mickey Edwards, The Case Against the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 191, 196 (1985).

92. Henry, 346 So. 2d at 158.
93. Id. at 162.
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deed, typically, authorizing legislation directs the creation of a program in the
first place. But the details of an appropriation bill inevitably affect the way the
agency functions and the nature of the programs the agency undertakes. In the
hurly-burly of the political process, legislatures often combine appropriations
and non-appropriation matters that are theoretically distinct but in practice
hard to keep apart. Language that is arguably general legislation is, thus, frequently a part of appropriations bills. There is no objective standard for determining whether a particular specification or detail is a part of the appropriation
or an "inappropriate" addition.
The notion of "connexity" is similarly unhelpful. If it means "germaneness," then few provisions will be treated as riders. Although there is not much
dispute in the courts that a nongermane proviso to the underlying appropriation
can be treated as a rider, in most cases the arguable rider will be germane to the
appropriation. In Colton and Welsh, for example, there was no contention that
the riders were nongermane. If "connexity" is to have more bite than germaneness, then it is as vague and open-ended as "inappropriate." To ask whether a
provision attached to an appropriation that seeks to affect the structure or performance of the agency funded by the appropriation has a "connexity" with the
appropriation is simply another way of asking whether a condition attached to
an appropriation is really a part of that appropriation or a separable piece of
general legislation. The appropriateness and connexity tests simply restate the
question of what an item is; they do not resolve it.
In Welsh v. Branstad, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested that the condition/rider line can be drawn "on the basis of whether the vetoed provision effectively qualified the subject, purpose, or amount of the appropriation either
quantitatively or objectively;"' 94 provisions that do not have that effect are vetoable riders. This test appears to be more precise and to provide a definition of an
item of appropriation, but as the Iowa court's own decisions indicate, that appearance is deceptive, for the actual distinction is quite murky. The court has
held that the governor may not veto a proviso attached to the appropriation
funding a certain program that determines the number of full-time paid positions in that program. 95 Does a proviso controlling staffing "effectively qualify
the subject, purpose, or amount" of the appropriation? Conversely, the court has
sustained the governor's veto of the proviso, attached to the funding for trade
missions, requiring those commissions to be bipartisan in composition. 96 Isn't
the composition of an agency funded by an appropriation part of the "subject"
of that appropriation? More to the point, are the two cases really distinguishable-is a proviso directing an agency not to cut its staffing really different, in
terms of its relationship to the underlying appropriation, from a proviso requiring that the agency be bipartisan in composition?
As noted, there may be cases where the vetoed language actually has noth94. 470 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Iowa 1991); see also Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d at 510 (does
proviso "affect the purpose of providing funds for the department" or "how the money was to be
spent").
95. Welsh, 470 N.W.2d at 649.
96. Id. at 651.
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ing to do with the underlying appropriation and in those cases the proviso may
easily be treated as a rider. But as long as the proviso purports to direct the
structure, function, operations, or procedures of the agency funded, it still in
some sense affects the subject of the appropriation. A restriction may be a "condition" not simply as a matter of drafting, but because at some key step in the
legislative process the restriction may have been crucial to the approval of the
appropriation.
Just as the affirmative/negative test misses the fact that the item veto is
always potentially affirmative, the attempt to apply the condition/rider test in
terms of the "subject, purpose, or amount" of the appropriation ignores the possibility that in the legislative process the subject or purpose of the appropriation
may be defined more broadly than the funding of a particular program and may
instead include the structure, organization, or procedures of the agency receiving the appropriation. To say that these broader policy issues are not a part of
the appropriation simply reopens the question of the appropriate place of language having broader policy consequences in an appropriation.
The condition/rider approach seeks to reconcile the item veto with traditional separation of powers concerns. Unlike the pure affirmative/negative approach it recognizes that a function of the item veto is to allow the governor to
undo the effects of legislative logrolling and to enable the governor to give separate consideration to measures that the legislature preferred to tie together. It
recognizes that the item veto changes the balance of power between the political
branches, and that consistent with this change the legislature cannot be given
unilateral authority to define a vetoable item. Yet the condition/rider test is also
faithful to the traditional primacy of the legislature over legislation. Many restrictions will be treated as conditions and protected from the governor's separate itemization. The problem is that the condition/rider distinction is
amorphous, if not indeterminate. It generates few predictable outcomes and instead results in considerable subjective judicial resolution of political conflicts.
The goal of integrating the item veto into the traditional executive-legislative relationship is an admirable one, and a number of state courts have attempted to resolve item veto questions through something like the condition/
rider framework. That this approach is premised on an illusory distinction and
leads to highly fact-specific ad hoc decision-making is less a fault of the courts
than an indication of the depth of the conflict between the traditional separation
of powers and the item veto.
3. The Executive-Centered Veto
Although most state courts have sought to view their item veto cases
through the prism of the affirmative/negative distinction, sometimes modified by
the condition/rider rule, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has articulated a dramatically different vision, interpreting the item veto to give the governor enormous quasi-legislative powers with respect to appropriations bills. The
Wisconsin court has construed that state's item veto provision to enable the governor to veto words and phrases, even if they are expressed as conditions on an
appropriation, and even when the effect of the gubernatorial action is to change
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legislative policy completely. Thus, in State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 97 the
court sustained a gubernatorial item veto which, by artful deletions, altered the
procedure for subjecting local tax increases to popular referenda. The legislative
bill had provided for optional referenda, contingent on the timely submission of
taxpayer petitions with a certain number of signatures, when local governments
sought to raise their tax levy limits. The governor's veto, by striking certain
words and phrases, made the local referendum mandatory. Similarly, in State ex
rel. Kleczka v. Conta,98 where the legislature created a system for the public
financing of election campaigns and funded it by allowing taxpayers to "add- on"
to their tax liabilities an additional dollar that would be placed in the state campaign fund, the governor, by clever use of the veto, converted the "add- on" to a
"check- off" in which taxpayers could commit a dollar of their existing tax liabilities to the campaign fund. 99 Most recently, in State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate
v. Thompson, 00 the Wisconsin court held that the governor could veto word
fragments, individual letters from words, and individual digits from numbers.
The only limitation the court would place on the governor's veto power is that
''what remains after the veto must be a complete and workable law" and the
result must be "germane" to the bill originally passed by the legislature.10 1
Wisconsin's executive-centered approach has two strengths: it safeguards
the item veto from legislative efforts at circumvention, and it enables the judiciary to avoid the frequently subjective and always difficult effort of determining
whether a governor's item veto is "affirmative" or "negative."'10 2 But the Wisconsin approach goes far toward converting the veto authority into a broad affirmative law-making power. Indeed, the only limits on the Wisconsin
governor's powers to craft new laws are the configuration of letters and digits on
the pages of the legislature's appropriations bills and the governor's own powers
of imagination.
The Wisconsin approach concentrates too much power in one branch of
government; indeed, the power would be in the hands of one individual. It is no
defense to say that the governor's action is subject to legislative override. So long
as a mere one-third plus one of the members of one house of the legislature are
willing to stand by the governor his item veto will not be overridden. It will be
rare that a governor would be unable to command the support of enough mem97. 237 N.W.2d 910 (Wis. 1976).
98. 264 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1978).
99. As passed by the legislature, the bill read: "Every individual filing an income tax statement
may designate that their income tax liability be increased by $1 for deposit into the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund for the use of eligible candidates." Id. at 545. Acting Governor Schreiber
lined out the words "that their income tax liability be increased by" and the words "deposit into."
Id. at 541.
100. 424 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1988).
101. Id. at 393.
102. The Washington Supreme Court cited the Wisconsin court's criticism of the subjectivity of
the affirmative/negative test and the test's tendency to insert the courts into a political dispute when
the Washington court also repudiated the affirmative/negative distinction as a limitation on the
governor's power to veto bill sections to change legislative policy. See Washington Fed'n of State
Employees v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 874-75 (Wash. 1984).
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bers of his own party to stave off an override. Nor is it an adequate defense that
the governor's "affirmative" lawmaking power is limited to appropriations bills
so that the legislature could curb gubernatorial creativity by keeping general
legislative matters out of appropriations bills. 10 3 As previously noted, appropriations and the programs those appropriations fund are often closely intertwined.
It may be difficult, if not unwise, for the legislature always to seek to separate the
two into different bills. In State ex reL. Kleczka v. Conta, the Wisconsin campaign finance case, for example, is it clear that it would have been preferable for
the legislature to have separated into two bills the mechanism for the creation of
the campaign fund and the appropriation for the fund solely to avoid the governor's power to convert the "add- on" into a "check- off"?
Even if the legislature could cabin the governor's power through a greater
separation of appropriations and general legislation, and, perhaps, a new level of
attention to the precise sequence of the letters used in legislative bills, the Wisconsin court's extreme approach would still be inconsistent with the historic
purpose of the item veto. The item veto is an anti-logrolling device focused on
appropriations. It enables the governor to disaggregate what the legislature has
put together. At most, the governor's power to disassemble ought to be congruent with the legislature's power to put items together, but the Wisconsin decisions actually give the governor the even broader power of disassembling the
words that constitute an item.
In a sense, the flaw in the Wisconsin approach is related to the court's
"complete and workable law" test. While the result of a valid item veto must, of
course, be a "complete and workable law" the item veto is not a grant of power
to create entirely new laws. Rather, it authorizes the disapproval of "items," or,
in Wisconsin, "parts.' 1°4 The court inappropriately focused solely on the lawafter-veto without also addressing the nature of the material vetoed. Given the
background of the item veto, the governor must be limited to the veto of component parts of the legislature's bills. And while the scope of an item may be
indeterminate, surely a bill is not constructed out of word fragments and letters.
As the Thompson dissenters noted, "as a practical matter, legislators do not
assemble legislative provisions by proposing and arranging individual letters." 10 5 Representatives legislate by combining concepts and proposals and
translating those ideas into specific bill language. The text of a bill incorporates
that collection of concepts; it is not "a potpourri of individual letters, an alphabet soup." 1 6 Not only the law that results, but also the material vetoed
should be "complete and workable," in the sense of denoting the concept or
policy or proposal vetoed.
Although all item vetoes have some affirmative or creative effect, allowing
the governor to veto word fragments and letters extends the item veto well be103. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate, 424 N.W.2d at 399 ("The solution is obvious and simple:
Keep the legislature's internally generated initiatives out of the budget bill (unless the legislature is
prepared to face the possibility of a partial veto).").
104. WIs. CONST. art. V, § 10.
105. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate, 424 N.W.2d at 401 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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yond the elimination of logrolling. It shifts the executive-legislative balance
sharply in the executive direction. In this setting neither "complete and workable law" nor "germaneness" is much of a limitation on gubernatorial power. In
Wisconsin the governor may be able to wield the item veto pen to produce a law
that has the exact opposite effect of the measure that passed the legislature. The
new law would be germane to the legislative measure and it could be "complete
and workable," but it would still be largely the act of one man and would be
enacted if he were able to persuade just one-third plus one of the members of one
house of the legislature to protect the item veto from an override. Nor does it
make for sound lawmaking to have a rule that permits the terms of the statute
ultimately enacted to turn on something as fortuitous as the exact sequence of
words used by the legislature or the cleverness of the governor in being able to
splice words and letters together to create new concepts.
Indeed, in 1990 in the aftermath of the Thompson decision the Wisconsin
voters approved a constitutional amendment which provides that in vetoing an
appropriation bill "the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill."' 0 7 This amendment properly limits
the governor to the anti-logrolling function of the item veto. The governor's
partial disapprovals may still have the effect of making new law, but that is only
as a consequence of his unbundling of legislative packages-which the item veto
is intended to permit. By its silence, this amendment preserves the Wisconsin
case law that gives the governor the power to veto digits-which gives him a
partial power of item reduction-and to veto words and phrases in a manner
that changes legislative policy and creates new legislation, as in the Kleczka and
Sundby decisions. As a result, the Wisconsin governor still has the broadest item
veto power in the country. 10 8 But, with the 1990 amendment, the Wisconsin rule
has the advantages of reflecting the changes in the executive-legislative relations
that the governor's power to undo legislative compromises necessarily entails,
while providing a clear rule for all three branches of government that avoids the
subjective applications of the arbitrary affirmative/negative test and minimizes
judicial involvement in executive-legislative conflicts. If it still leaves the governor with far too much law-making power, the fault may be with the item veto
itself rather than with the Wisconsin court's interpretation.
In short, none of the three approaches to the definition of a vetoable item is
satisfactory. The narrow approach confines the item veto power and constitutes
an invitation to the legislature to evade the governor's authority through the
107. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10()(c).
108. See Dennis Farney, When Wisconsin's Governor Wields Partial Veto, the Legislature Might
as Well Go Play Scrabble, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1993, at A16. Another state court that has given its
governor broad item veto authority is the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In Karcher v. Kean, 479
A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the governor may veto "general and
broad conditions affixed to the expenditure or use of appropriated funds.., without necessarily and
simultaneously eliminating or reducing any specific item of appropriated funds." Id. at 416-17. The
court interpreted the item veto provision of the state constitution to include the veto of "parts" of
items of appropriations and concluded that the governor enjoyed that "broad discretion" to veto
conditions. The court did not articulate a general definition of a vetoable item or consider whether
the governor could veto individual words, as can the Governor of Wisconsin.
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agglomeration of matters in single sections of bills. The broad approach protects
the item veto but at the price of a definition of "item" that strains credulity and
effects an enormous extension of the governor's law-making power. The middle
path is more sensitive than the others to the purpose of the item veto and seeks
to reconcile the item veto with traditional concepts of separation of powers
rather than have one ignore or displace the other. The middle approach, however, vests enormous discretion in the judiciary and so far has failed to produce a
coherent standard for resolving item veto disputes or predicting the outcome of
future item veto cases.
III.

THE DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATIONS BILL

Forty-two of the forty-three states that grant their governors the item veto
authority limit it to "appropriations bills."' 1 9 Just like "item," "appropriations
bill" is a term in need of a definition, yet most state constitutions do not provide
one. The definition of an appropriations bill raises two questions: how to categorize a bill that combines appropriations with general legislation; and whether a
measure that affects the spending of state funds, but does not actually appropriate those funds, is an appropriation. These issues are not as conceptually knotty
as those involved in the definition of an "item." Nevertheless, their resolution
has considerable impact on the scope of the governor's item veto authority.
A. The Combination of Appropriationsand General Legislation
When the legislature combines appropriations and general legislative provisions in the same bill is the result an appropriations bill? Courts have pursued
three general approaches to the definition of "appropriations bill." Some would
limit the availability of the item veto to only those bills that have the "primary
purpose" of making appropriations. Others would permit the item veto in any
bill that makes an appropriation, even if the bill is largely devoted to other purposes. 110 And one court would permit the item veto to apply in a bill making an
appropriation with a significant effect on state government.
The leading "primary purpose" case is also the only United States Supreme
Court case dealing with the item veto-Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
PhilippineIslands,III which involved the construction of the item veto provision
of the Philippines' territorial constitution. In Bengzon, the United States
Supreme Court held:
an appropriation bill is one the primary and specific aim of which
109. The only exception is Washington. See WASH. CONsT. art. III, § 12.
110. A handful of state courts have held that because the texts of their constitutions make the
item veto available only for bills making "items" of appropriation, a requirement for the item veto is
that the bill make more than one appropriation. See, e.g., Perry v. Decker, 457 A.2d 357, 360 (Del.
1983) (use of plural "appropriations" indicated exclusion of bills making only one appropriation);
Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082, 1089 (Idaho 1978) (allowing item veto of appropriations bill
suggests that item veto does not apply to bills making a single appropriation). Even in these states,
there will be some question whether a bill that makes two appropriations and also contains considerable general legislative matter is an appropriations bill.
111. 299 U.S. 410 (1937).
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is to make appropriations of money from the public treasury. To say
otherwise would be to confuse an appropriation bill proposing sundry
of
appropriations of money with a bill proposing sundry provisions
112
general law and carrying an appropriation as an incident.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, several state supreme courts, including
those of New Mexico and Wisconsin, have found that any bill that contains an
appropriation is an appropriation bill. Thus, the item vetoes in the Sundby and
Kleczka cases occurred in bills which had the primary purpose of regulating
local levy limits or creating a state election campaign fund. The Supreme Court
of New Mexico, in Dickson v. Saiz, sustained a veto of a portion of the state
Liquor Control Act which dealt with Sunday sales; presumably the bill had an
discussed in the opinion and was
appropriation in it somewhere, but it was never
1 13
clearly not the primary purpose of the bill.
In the middle here as in the definition of a vetoable item is the Iowa
Supreme Court which recently rejected both the "primary purpose" and the
"any appropriation" tests and determined that the "proper test is to review each
bill on an ad hoc basis and determine whether the bill contains an appropriation
14
which could significantly affect the governor's budgeting responsibility."'
By limiting the availability of the item veto, Bengzon is congruent with the
federal constitutional setting, where the item veto is an aberration and distorts
the traditional separation of powers. But in the state constitutional setting,
where the item veto was intended to alter the separation of powers and enhance
the role of the governor in the budgetary process, the primary purpose test creates incentives for evasion and is, in any event, difficult to apply. The "primary
purpose" approach gives the legislature considerable power to exempt bills containing appropriations from the item veto by the simple expedient of combining
appropriations with other types of legislation. Under the primary purpose test,
once enough non-appropriations matter is included, an appropriations bill would
be converted into a piece of general legislation and immunized from the item
veto.
The primary purpose test can also be highly subjective. How is the primary
purpose of a bill to be determined? Is it by the percentage of the bill's text-the
number of sections, pages, or lines--devoted to appropriations and to nonappropriations purposes? If so, then the applicability of the item veto could turn on
the constitutional irrelevancy of the detail, rather than the scope, of the general
legislative portion of the bill. In a bill that created a new program and provided
the appropriations necessary to fund it, a short description of the program might
lead a court to conclude that the bill was primarily an appropriations measure,
112. Id. at 413.
113. 308 P.2d 205 (1957); see also State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (1974)
(item veto applies to "bills of general legislation, which contain incidental items of appropriation, as
well as general appropriations bills").
114. Junkins v. Branstad, 448 N.W.2d 480, 484-85 (Iowa 1989); see also Thompson v. Graham,
481 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1985) (permitting item veto in bill in which only one of bill's 800 sections
contained appropriation because sum of money involved and number of projects funded made appropriation more than "incidental").
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while a more extensive description might cause a court to determine that the
appropriation was only secondary. A less mechanical, more qualitative approach
might seem less arbitrary but each controversial item veto could lead to a court
contest in which the governor and legislative leaders would offer to the judge
conflicting evidence concerning the intent and effect of a piece of legislation. The
courts would be compelled to examine the inner workings of the legislative process, and perhaps, the motives of legislators in sponsoring or voting for a measure, in order to determine the primary purpose. In any particular case the
results of the "primary purpose" test would be impossible to predict and the
determination of "primary purpose" would inevitably be the product of a subjective judgment.
The same uncertainty plagues Iowa's significant effect test. Is there to be a
dollar threshold for significance, or a minimum percentage of the total state
budget? It is not at all clear how significant an effect must be to qualify as a
"significant effect," nor is it clear how significance is to be determined.
The "any appropriation" test is an executive- centered approach, but that is
less problematic in the definition of an appropriations bill than in the definition
of an item. The "any appropriation" standard is easier to apply than either of
the other tests and it is more clearly consistent with the history and purpose of
the item veto: to permit the governor to give separate consideration to, and make
a separate determination about, every item of appropriation. This reflects the
concern, under an executive budget system, that the governor play a primary
role, subject to legislative override, in determining the state's budget; that the
governor be able to limit appropriations in order to meet balanced budget requirements and achieve the general goal of fiscal restraint; and that the governor
be able to unbundle appropriations measures and pass on each item of appropriation separately. Although the "any appropriation" test expands the governor's
authority, this is just the kind of alteration in the balance of legislative- executive
power that the item veto was intended to achieve. Moreover, the legislature can
protect itself by adhering to a strict separation of appropriations and non-appropriations matters, thereby vindicating the single-subject rule as well. 115
. What Is An Appropriation?
The question of what is an appropriation requires a court to determine
when legislative action would clearly commit the state to the expenditure of
state funds for a public purpose. 116 One issue is the relationship of an appropriation to an authorization to spend state money on a specific program. An authori115. The "any appropriation" test is particularly appropriate in states that allow the governor
to veto nonmonetary items and legislative riders on appropriations. If the item veto authority exists
when appropriations and non-appropriations provisions are found in the same bill, and can be applied to the nonmonetary items, why should it matter that a bill contains more non-appropriations
items than appropriations items? The threats to the executive budget, fiscal constraint, and the antilogrolling principle are posed whenever appropriations and non-appropriations provisions are combined, whatever the proportion.
116. See Junkins, 448 N.W.2d at 483 (test for "appropriation" whether money may be paid or
drawn on authority of act).
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zation is an essential precondition for subsequent spending. It may create a
political climate in which the state feels compelled to appropriate the funds necessary to honor the commitment in the authorization. It may be quite specific, as
in the adoption of a formula for aid to localities or the poor or for the payment
of private parties who provided state-subsidized services to the poor. Such an
authorization may give rise to a claim of entitlement on the part of the intended
recipients and, thus, have a powerful impact on state spending. The effects of
such authorizations and aid formulas on state budgets support an argument that
they be treated as appropriations for item veto purposes even if they are not
appropriations in the technical sense. Nevertheless, state courts have generally
adhered to a formal definition of appropriations and have excluded from the
definition of appropriation authorizations and other substantive legislation that
17
create spending programs but do not actually appropriate funds. 1
This interpretation of appropriation has had the effect of limiting the item
veto without undermining it. The authorization/appropriation distinction has a
long pedigree, and may have been assumed by the drafters of state item veto
provisions. It may also be that rigid adherence to this formal distinction is more
judicially manageable than a standard requiring the courts to gauge the effect of
an authorization measure on state spending. The sharpness of the distinction has
also sometimes benefited governors, as state courts have held that governors
may veto or reduce appropriations without having to veto the underlying authorization for the entitlement program that the legislature intended to imple8
ment through the appropriation.' 1
More thorny than the appropriation/authorization distinction have been
the difficulties created by the states' increased utilization of earmarked taxes and
special funds. The traditional conception of the state budget is that revenues are
collected from taxes and other sources and deposited into the state's general
fund and then annually or biennially appropriated for the purposes specified in
the budget. Today, however, many states rely extensively on special taxes and
special funds. Taxes may be authorized with the requirement that the revenues
be earmarked for deposit into a special fund which may be used only for a special purpose. This may make the tax more acceptable politically and may give
the beneficiaries of the funded program greater assurance that the expenditures
117. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska 1977) (bond issue authorization not
appropriation); Harbor v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Cal. 1987) (provision requiring AFDC
benefits to be paid from date of application rather than from date application processed, and ultimately requiring payment of additional funds from state treasury, is substantive measure and not
appropriation); State ex rel. Akron Educ. Ass'n v. Essex, 351 N.E.2d 118, 120 (Ohio 1976) (change
in formula for calculating state aid to school districts not appropriation); State ex rel. Finnegan v.
Dammann, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (Wis. 1936) (revenue bill intended to fund state program not appropriation); cf Karcher v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 410 (N.J. 1984) ("[T]he operative statutes imposing
the public utilities franchise and gross receipts taxes and providing for their distribution are not
themselves appropriations.").
118. See, e.g., People ex rel. I.F.T. v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ill.) (governor permitted
to reduce amount of appropriations made to pension fund), cert denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Barnes
v. Secretary of Admin., 586 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Mass. 1992) (governor's reduction by 50% of emergency assistance program within power of item veto).
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will ultimately be made. Is the deposit of tax dollars into a special fund to be
treated as an appropriation?
If the focus of analysis is on the expenditure of state funds for a public
purpose, then the deposit into the special fund may not be an appropriation.
After all, the mere placement of tax dollars in the special fund does not mean
they will be spent and it is conceivable that subsequent legislative changes will
return those dollars to the general fund. On the other hand, if the focus is on the
segregation of the tax dollars from the general fund and the commitment of the
revenue to the designated statutory purpose, then the creation or deposit of
funds into a special fund might very well be treated as an appropriation. 1 9 Indeed, the more a special fund resembles a "locked box" from which moneys can
be withdrawn only as expenditures for the statutory purpose, the more the deposit of moneys into the fund resembles an appropriation.
The situation becomes more complicated as the special funds, and the relationships among the general fund and various special funds, become more complex. Are measures that redesignate certain tax revenues from one special fund
to another, 1 20 or that transfer funds out of the special fund and back to the
general fund, appropriations? 12 Some special funds consist of moneys received
from private contributions (such as withholding from state employees) and general fund dollars as well as earmarked tax revenues. Are changes in the formulas
in the amount of general
for payments into the funds, with concomitant changes
1 22
fund dollars placed in these funds, appropriations?
There is no consistent line of decisions among the state courts, but in a
number of cases the court's resolution of the definition of an appropriation was
plainly influenced by its attitude toward the item veto, and the item veto's effect
on the traditional separation of powers. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court, citing
its general view that the item veto "gives the governor a larger role in the state
budgetary process," determined that "the allocation of funds ...into a separate
and distinct fund that the State can no longer utilize for other purposes absent
subsequent legislation is an appropriation" for item veto purposes. 123 Similarly,
the Arizona Supreme Court has held that legislation transferring funds out of a
special fund is an appropriation subject to the governor's item veto power because such an action would reduce the amount of the previous deposit into the
special fund. Such transfers would reduce the appropriation for the specially
funded purpose: "The Constitution does not permit such reductions free of gubernatorial oversight. To hold otherwise ... would seriously limit the Execu119. See Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 25 (Ariz. 1992) (transfer of funds from special funds
to state's general fund is appropriation).
120. See Johnson v. Carlson, 494 N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (governor's item
veto, resulting in redirection of special funds, deemed unconstitutional).
121. See, e.g., Rios, 833 P.2d at 26-27 (transfer of funds from special to general fund appropriation and subject to item veto).
122. See, e.g., Junkins v. Branstad, 448 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Iowa 1989) (set aside of specific
funds deemed appropriation).
123. Id. at 483-84.
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tive's constitutional role in the appropriation process."' 124 On the other hand, a
Minnesota court recently held that the transfer of certain earmarked tax dollars
from one special fund to another did not involve an appropriation. 125 As the
court acknowledged, its decision was largely driven by a previous Minnesota
Supreme Court decision that determined that the governor's item veto "isan
exception to the authority granted to the legislature" and "must be narrowly
26

construed." 1
As the Iowa and Arizona cases suggest, the item veto and the executive
budget are intended to give the governor an enhanced role in the state budgetary
process and in the determination of state fiscal priorities. These factors counsel
against a narrow definition of appropriation and suggest instead that when legislation depositing state moneys into a special fund effectively subtracts those
funds from the general fund and commits them to a particular program, the
purposes underlying the item veto require that such legislation be treated as an
appropriation. It may at times be uncertain, however, just how locked up the
moneys in a special fund are, and the state courts have only begun to address
this question.
Moreover, as the Minnesota decision suggests, the definition of appropriation is inevitably shaped by judicial attitudes concerning the impact of the item
veto on executive-legislative relations. 127 Courts concerned that a governor may
use the veto power to "modify the legislative strategy"' 2 8 may be apt to define
"appropriation" not solely in terms of state budget practices and the effect of
special fund mechanisms on the general fund but also in terms of a concern to
cabin the governor's power.
In short, in the definition of "appropriation bill," as in the definition of an
"item," state courts have had to grapple with the uncertainties of language in the
light of contemporary fiscal and institutional practices in state government.
And, as with the definition of "item," the resolution of this issue has powerful
implications for the distribution of power between the executive and the
legislature.
CONCLUSION

As the state item veto cases indicate, the item veto is not simply a mechanical device for increasing executive control over the budget or reducing fiscal
imbalances. Rather, by altering the role of the executive in the enactment of
laws, the item veto opens questions about basic structural arrangements. The
item veto forces us to think closely about the relationship of the parts of a bill to
each other and to the bill as a whole; to consider the degree to which the executive's power to unravel legislative packages conflicts with our customary notions
of legislative intent and the way in which legislatures reach agreement; and to
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Rios, 833 P.2d at 26.
Johnson v. Carlson, 494 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id. (quoting Inter Faculty Org. v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Minn. 1991)).
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address the meaning of appropriation at a time when state finances are seriously
affected by measures that do not fall within the traditional definition of appropriation. Although the item veto has long been a part of the state budget process, these issues remain unresolved or inadequately resolved in many states.
This may be attributable to their inherent difficulty. Indeed- to return for a
moment to the value of state constitutional law as a "laboratory" of democratic
experimentation and a potential model for federal constitutional changes-if
Congress, driven by fiscal and political concerns, should ever decide to give serious attention to the state item veto as a model for the Federal Constitution, it
must also give comparable attention to the questions of interpretation and allocation of law-making responsibility that result when the item veto is grafted onto
the long-standing federal system of separation of powers.

